

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

23 September 1980

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment

Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED]
Acting, National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

25X1

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 16 September 1980)

This warning meeting dealt almost exclusively with the situation in Poland and the possibility of Soviet military intervention.

1. Discussion focused upon the possible implications of three pieces of information:

[REDACTED] 25X1

-- Out of garrison activities by some Soviet ground force units in the Western USSR.

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 25X1

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

Copy No. 1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 16 September 1980)

25X1

25X1

3. Reporting on military movements in the Western USSR, [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Of five divisions [redacted] in the Baltic, two were out of garrison; and 200 civilian trucks had been assembled to assist one of the divisions -- with no apparent harvesting mission. It looked, therefore, as if at least 1-2 divisions were being partially mobilized here, although whether or not this was for an exercise was uncertain. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] it could not be confidently asserted that the Soviets were not taking the first steps to mobilize for a possible future invasion of Poland.

25X1

4. There were no sharply-opposed differences among agencies in their interpretations of this evidence or in their broader readings of the likelihood of Soviet intervention, although there were shadings of opinion and personal hypotheses.

25X1

6. A CIA analyst presented as an alternative to conventional thinking the hypothesis that, rather than take for granted that the Soviets would assume Polish military resistance and would therefore automatically plan for a 30-division invasion, we should consider the possibility that the Soviets might have confidence in the senior Polish military command and might agree to reenforce the Polish army with a Soviet force that would assist the Poles in curbing the concessions. A smaller Soviet force introduced with Polish permission would demonstrate Soviet resolve, hedge against the possible need for a rapid deployment of force, and reenforce the Polish army where it was especially weak (e.g., in the Warsaw area). Another analyst representative offered a variant of this hypothesis: that the Polish regime would accede to a Soviet request to introduce 2-5 divisions in order to (a) pacify the Soviets and (b) intimidate the population. Doubts were expressed, however, that the Polish leaders would voluntarily invite Soviet troops into the country.

7. Summing up this part of the discussion, participants agreed to the following propositions:

- The evidence is consistent with, and indicative of, heightened Soviet preparedness for military intervention in Poland.
- We are seeing evidence of military exercises that are consistent with preparation for military contingencies in Poland.

25X1

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

25X1

23 September 1980

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 16 September 1980)

- The activity that we see could be consistent with mobilization for military involvement in Poland.
- We have not seen yet the level of activity we would expect to see if an invasion were imminent by -- say -- 30 divisions.
- What we are seeing is consistent with the early introduction of some Soviet military units into Poland (i.e., conceivably with a Polish invitation).

8. Discussion then shifted to the Walesa warning of a possible general strike on October 15 and, more broadly, whether some sort of explosion could be anticipated in the next 30 days.

9. The Walesa statement indicated three possible courses of action by the free trade union leadership:

- If they got what they were promised by the regime, they would exhort the workers to work harder.
- If they got only part of what they were promised, they would call a "warning strike".
- If they got nothing, then they would call a general strike by October 15.

The question was posed, should we take the assertion of an October review of the situation by the free trade union leadership seriously, and should we expect confrontation and/or Soviet military intervention within the next 30 days?

10. Opinions were not polarized on these questions, and nobody took the position that a blowup in Poland was impossible within 30 days. There was agreement that outright non-compliance by the regime with its agreement with the workers, if this occurred within 30 days, would precipitate a major crisis. Beyond this proposition, there were different shadings of emphasis.

11. At one end of the spectrum, there were those who felt that, from the Soviet viewpoint, Kania was already making too many concessions, that the situation was not under control, that there was the danger of snowballing demands by other groups (such as journalists), and that there was the clear possibility that a political dynamic might gain momentum that could rapidly undermine the system. At the other end of the spectrum were those who placed more emphasis on the contingent nature of developments, recognition by the Soviets that it would take time to roll back the concessions, the capacity of the Soviets to live with anomalies at least for awhile, and their readiness

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

23 September 1980

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 16 September 1980)

in the meantime to keep up the pressure on the Poles while preparing for intervention should that prove necessary in the longer run.

Iran

12. There was a brief discussion of Iran. In the warning context, some analysts dissented that the Soviets probably wanted to see moderation on both sides in the Iranian/Iraqi border conflict, while others stressed that the Soviets might respond to a conflict in an actively exploitative fashion.

[REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] 25X1

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

23 September 1980

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 16 September 1980)

DISTRIBUTION

#1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - NSC Coordination Staff
4 - ER
5 - DD/NFA
6 - DD/NFAC
7 - SACI/NFAC
8 - AS/NFAC
9 - NIO/Warning
10 - NIO/USSR-EE
11 - NFAC Reg.
A/NIO/USSR-EE [REDACTED]
(23Sept80)

25X1

25X1

- 5 -

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

23 September 1980